


Computational Neuroimaging

Andreea Diaconescu

Methods & Models 2015

Special thanks to Christoph Mathys



What is it all about?

- Why do we use functional magnetic resonance imaging?
 - To measure brain activity
- When does the brain become active?
 - When it learns
i.e., when its predictions & precisions about the world have to be adjusted
- Where do these predictions come from?
 - A model

Advantages of model-based neuroimaging

- Model-based neuroimaging permits us to:
 - **Infer** the computational mechanisms underlying brain function
 - **Localize** such mechanisms
 - **Compare** different models

Explanatory Gap



Biological

- Molecular
- Neurochemical



Cognitive

- Computational
- “cognitive/
computational
phenotyping”



Phenomenological

- Performance
Accuracy
- Reaction Time
- Choices, preferences



Computational
Models

Three Levels of Inference


- *Computational Level*: predictions, prediction errors
- *Algorithmic Level*: reinforcement learning, hierarchical Bayesian inference, predictive coding
- *Implementational Level*: Brain activity, neuromodulation




David Marr, 1982

■ 3 ingredients:


1. Experimental paradigm:




2. Computational model of learning:




3. Model-based fMRI analysis:




Outline



Outline




How to build a model




Example of a simple model


Rescorla-Wagner Learning:




From perception to action



From perception to action




From perception to action to observation



Observing the observer

- The observer obtains input from the world via the sensory systems
- He/she has prior beliefs about the state of the world and how it is changing.
- Based on these prior beliefs and the sensory inputs, he makes **predictions.**



Daunizeau et al., PONE, 2011


Observing the observer

- The observer obtains input from the world via the sensory systems
- He/she has prior beliefs about the state of the world and how it is changing.
- Based on these prior beliefs and the sensory inputs, he makes **predictions**.

- As the experimenter, we want to infer on what the observer is thinking ...
- But all we can observe is his/her behaviour.
- We invert the observer's beliefs from his/her behaviour: computational model

Daunizeau et al., PONE, 2011

From perception to action





- In behavioural tasks, we observe actions a
- How do we use them to infer on beliefs λ ?
- Answer: we invert (estimate) a **response model**

Example of a simple response model

- Options A, B and C have values: $v_A = 8, v_B = 4, v_C = 2$
- We translate these values into action probabilities via a *Softmax* function:

$$p(a = A) = \frac{e^{\beta v_A}}{e^{\beta v_A} + e^{\beta v_B} + e^{\beta v_C}}$$


- Parameter β determines sensitivity to value differences:




All the necessary ingredients

- Perceptual model (updates based on prediction errors)
- Value function (inferred state to action value)
- Response model (action value to response probability)

Outline



Outline



Reinforcement Learning (RL) Models

- Reinforcement signals define an agent's goals (state created by the presence of reward)
 - in RL: goal of an agent is to take actions that lead to **maximization of total future rewards**

$$V(s_t) = E \left[\sum_{\tau} t(\tau) \right]$$

Value is the average sum of future rewards delivered from state s_t

- We want to learn V , but we can only learn an approximation of V based on the evidence so far.
- Simplify V via recursion: $V(s_t) = E[r_t] + V(s_{t+1})$

The teaching signal

- Update via reward prediction errors (PEs)
 - $PE \approx \text{current reward} - \text{previous value (prediction)}$

$$\delta_t = E[r_t] - \hat{V}(s_t)$$

- Rescorla-Wagner learning: PEs weighted by a fixed learning rate
 - Value update $\approx \text{learning rate} \times PE$


$$\Delta V(s_{t+1}) = \alpha(E[r_t] - \hat{V}(s_t))$$

$$\mu^{(k)} = \mu^{(k-1)} + \alpha(u^{(k)} - \mu^{(k-1)})$$

$$\Delta\mu^{(k)} = \alpha(u^{(k)} - \mu^{(k-1)}) = \alpha\delta^{(k)}$$

(Montague et al., 2004; Rescorla and Wagner, 1972)

Perception (learning) via hierarchical interactions



Hierarchical Bayesian Models


- Inference on the state of the world
- Beliefs are represented via probability distributions
 - Therefore: uncertainty (variance of the distribution) affects belief-updating
- Hierarchy of beliefs: state of the world and its volatility
- Efficient implementation in the brain promoted by evolutionary selection:
 - e.g. hierarchical architecture

Bayesian Models



Bayes' Rule

$$\underbrace{p(u|x, \vartheta)}_{\text{likelihood}} \cdot \underbrace{p(x, \vartheta)}_{\text{prior}} \propto \underbrace{p(x, \vartheta|u)}_{\text{posterior}}$$



- Includes **uncertainty** about hidden states
- Beliefs have **precisions**

Bayesian Models



$$\underset{\text{posterior}}{p(x|u)} = \frac{\underset{\text{likelihood}}{p(u|x)} \underset{\text{prior}}{p(x)}}{\underset{\text{evidence}}{\int p(u|x')p(x')dx}}$$


- In all but the simplest cases, the equation for the model evidence has no closed-form solutions.
- One way to deal with this is to introduce approximations.
- One possible and plausible approximation to the model evidence is variational free energy (cf. Friston, 2007; Feynman, 1972)

The hierarchical Gaussian filter (HGF): a computationally tractable model for individual learning under uncertainty

Parameter ϑ (how much volatility can change)

Parameter κ (connection between the levels)

Parameter ω (tonic learning rate, allows for individual differences in \mathbf{x}_2)




state \mathbf{x}_3 (estimate of volatility of the state of the world)




state \mathbf{x}_2 (current belief about the state of the world)

state \mathbf{x}_1 (sigmoid transformation of \mathbf{x}_2 , category)

Mathys et al., Frontiers, 2011

The hierarchical Gaussian filter (HGF): a computationally tractable model for individual learning under uncertainty



State of the world	Model
Log-volatility x_3 of tendency	$p(x_3^{(k)}) \sim N(x_3^{(k-1)}, \vartheta)$ Gaussian random walk with constant step size ϑ 
Tendency x_2 towards category "1"	$p(x_2^{(k)}) \sim N(x_2^{(k-1)}, \exp(\kappa x_3 + \omega))$ Gaussian random walk with step size $\exp(\kappa x_3 + \omega)$ 
Stimulus category x_1 ("0" or "1")	$p(x_1=1) = s(x_2)$ $p(x_1=0) = 1-s(x_2)$ Sigmoid transformation of x_2 

Mathys et al., Frontiers, 2011

HGF: Variational inversion and update equations

- Inversion proceeds by introducing a mean field approximation and fitting quadratic approximations to the resulting variational energies.
- This leads to simple one-step update equations for the sufficient statistics (mean and precision) of the approximate Gaussian posteriors of the hidden states x_i .
- The updates of the means have the same structure as value updates in Rescorla-Wagner learning:


$$\Delta\mu_i = \frac{\hat{\pi}_{i-1}}{\pi_i} \delta_{i-1}$$

Prediction Error

Precisions determine
the learning rate

Hierarchical Learning

Simulations: $\mathcal{G} = 0.5$, $\omega = -2.2$, $\kappa = 1.4$




HGF: Hierarchical Precision-weighted PEs

1. Value Update: $\Delta\mu_2 = \frac{1}{\pi_2} \cdot \delta_1$ where $\pi_2 = \hat{\pi}_2 + \frac{1}{\hat{\pi}_1}$

2. Volatility Update: $\Delta\mu_3 = \frac{\kappa}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{\pi_3} \cdot w_2 \cdot \delta_2$


RL models: $\Delta v = \alpha \cdot \delta$

HGF: Dynamic Learning Rates



Diaconescu et al., 2013

HGF: Dynamic Learning Rates



Diaconescu et al., 2013


Which model is better?

- Reinforcement Learning?
- Hierarchical Bayesian Model?


Model Comparison: An example

- Advice-Taking Task:

PLAYER



ADVISER



Model Space

Factor 1: Perceptual Models




*Factor 2:
Response Models: Belief
to Decision Mapping*

*Factor 3:
Response Models:
Integrated versus Reduced*



Specific Models





Winning model





Translational Neuromodeling Unit



Social Interactive Study





EEG Study



fMRI Study 1



fMRI Study 2



Winning model

Level 3: Volatility of intentions


$$p\left(x_3^{(k)}\right) \sim \mathcal{N}\left(x_3^{(k-1)}, \vartheta\right)$$

Level 2: Tendency towards helpful advice (adviser fidelity)

$$p\left(x_2^{(k)}\right) \sim \mathcal{N}\left(x_2^{(k-1)}, e^{\left(\kappa x_3^{(k-1)}+\omega\right)}\right)$$

Level 1: Observations (accurate or inaccurate advice)


$$p\left(x_1=1\right)=\frac{1}{1+e^{-x_2}}$$




$$p\left(u^{(k)}=1\left|\mu_1^{(k-1)}, \tilde{c}\right.\right)=b^{(k)}=\zeta \mu_1^{(k-1)}+(1-\zeta) \tilde{c}^{(k)}$$

$$p\left(y^{(k)}=1\left|b^{(k)}\right.\right)=\frac{b^{(k) \beta}}{b^{(k) \beta}+(1-b^{(k)}) \beta}$$

Outline



Outline



Model-based fMRI: The advantage

The question event-related/block designs answer:


- Where in the brain do particular experimental conditions elicit BOLD responses?

The question model-based fMRI answers:

- How (i.e., by activation of which areas) does the brain implement a particular cognitive process?

It is able to do so because its regressors correspond to particular cognitive processes instead of experimental conditions.


Example of a simple learning model



- Pavlovian conditioning:
 - abstract visual stimuli paired with sweet/neutral taste


$$\delta_t = E[r_t] + \gamma \hat{V}(s_{t+1}) - \hat{V}(s_t)$$

- Signed PE with a fixed learning rate:
 - ventral striatum
 - OFC and cerebellum





O'Doherty et al., Neuron, 2003

Application of the HGF: Sensory Learning




Changes in cue strength (black), and posterior expectation of visual category (red)




Iglesias et al., Neuron, 2013

Application of the HGF: Two types of PEs

1. Outcome PE




2. Cue-Outcome Contingency PE



Iglesias et al., Neuron,

Application of the HGF: Representation of precision-weighted PEs

1. Outcome PE




$z = -18$

- right VTA

Dopamine


2. Probability PE




- left basal forebrain
- Acetylcholine**

Iglesias et al., Neuron, 2013

Neuromodulatory Systems



Application to Social Learning




recommendations of adviser were **veridical** (pre-recorded videos from behavioural study)

volatility of advice (changing intentions of adviser through incentive structure)



interactive, gender-matched (**40** male subjects)

fMRI design: Philips Achieva 3T
TR/TE 2500/36ms, 2 x 2 x 3 mm³





Diaconescu et al., *PLoS CB* 2014




Advice Fidelity Prediction Error



Adviser Intentions Prediction Error




Adviser Intention Uncertainty




How do we construct regressors that correspond to cognitive processes and use them in SPM?

1. Pass individual subject trial history into SPM:



Response y (orange=1 advice was taken), input u (green=1 advice was accurate)



Diaconescu et al., In Prep

How do we construct regressors that correspond to cognitive processes and use them in SPM?

2. Estimated subject-by-subject model parameters:

- Model Inversion:

```
running model/param combination 4 of 546
Irregular trials: none
Ignored trials: none
Irregular trials: none

Optimizing...

Calculating the negative free energy...


Results:
mu2_0: 1.0665
sa2_0: 1.4966
mu3_0: 1
sa3_0: 1
ka: 0
om: -10
th: 1.0000e-18
p: [1.0665 1.4966 1 1 0 -10 1.0000e-18]
ptrans: [1.0665 0.4032 1 0 -22.3327 -10 -34.5388]

ze1: 0.8816
ze2: 48.0000
p: [0.8816 48.0000]
ptrans: [2.0073 3.8712]


Negative free energy F: -82.9603
```

How do we construct regressors that correspond to cognitive processes and use them in SPM?

3. Generate model-based time-series:




3. Convolve them with HRF:



Adapted from O'Doherty et al., 2007

How do we construct regressors that correspond to cognitive processes and use them in SPM?

5. Construct your GLM:



Adapted from Behrens et al., 2010



Estimate: single subject

6. First-level analysis:

- Load your regressors:

```
reg1 =
```


```
[1x189 double]  
[1x189 double]  
[1x189 double]
```

```
 mu1hat      <1x189 double>  
 positive_PE  <1x189 double>
```

Estimate: single subject

6. First-level analysis:


- Open SPM: Specify first level analysis



Estimate: single subject

6. First-level analysis:



- Load Design matrix into Batch editor



Estimate: single subject

6. First-level analysis:


- Examine results:
 - PE




Estimate: single subject

6. First-level analysis:

- Examine results:
 - `mu1hat`




SPMresults:
Height threshold $T = 2.329363$
Extent threshold $k = 300$ voxels



Estimate: group



6. Second-level analysis:

- Open SPM: Specify second-level analysis




Estimate: group


7. Second-level analysis: variation in PE representation across different learning styles



Outline



Outline




Tips for efficient experimental design

1. Design your “model space” before designing your experiment:
 - The research question and set of hypotheses will determine your model space
 - Formalize your hypotheses mathematically: these will become your models


2. Use simulations to design your “optimal” input structure
 - Input structure which best allows you to identify your parameters of interest

Example: Social learning experiment



- How do subjects infer on the advice accuracy?
- Do they integrate the binary lottery information along with the advice?

Example: Social learning experiment



- Hypothesis: Subjects infer on the adviser's intentions, which then determines the validity of the advice.
- Subjects integrate both sources of information during decision-making

Example: Social learning experiment


- Based on our hypotheses, we define our model space:

Hypothesis 1: intentions?

Perceptual Models




*Response Models:
Integrated versus Reduced*




Hypothesis 2: integration?

Example: Social learning experiment

- Simulations: under what conditions can we recover our parameters of interest?




No Volatility: 80% adviser reliability




Example: Social learning experiment


- Simulations: under what conditions, can we recover our parameters of interest?



High Volatility: 80% adviser reliability



Simulation Results: Demo



Take-Home Message

- Efficient experimental design is formalizing hypotheses in terms of mathematical models.
- Model-based regressors allow for investigation of mechanisms in the brain that are not accessible via direct observation.
- Abstract model-based quantities such as prediction error have shown to correlate with strong neuronal activation.
- In SPM, model-based regressors are treated just like any other parametric modulation.

References

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